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Abstract—The techniques and tactics used by cyber adversaries
are becoming more sophisticated, ironically, as defense getting
stronger and the cost of a breach continuing to rise. Under-
standing the thought processes and behaviors of adversaries is
extremely challenging as high profile or even amateur attackers
have no incentive to share the trades associated with their illegal
activities. One opportunity to observe the actions the adversaries
perform is through the use of Intrusion Detection Systems (IDS)
which generate alerts in the event that suspicious behavior was
detected. The alerts raised by these systems typically describe the
suspicious actions via the form of attack ‘signature’, which do
not necessarily reveal the true intent of the attacker performing
the action. Meanwhile, several high level frameworks exist to
describe the sequence or chain of action types an adversary
might perform. These frameworks, however, do not connect
the action types to observables of standard intrusion detection
systems, nor describing the plausible intents of the adversarial
actions. To address these gaps, this work proposes the Action-
Intent Framework (AIF) to complement existing Cyber Attack
Kill Chains and Attack Taxonomies. The AIF defines a set of
Action-Intent States (AIS) at two levels of description: the Macro-
AIS describes ‘what’ the attacker is trying to achieve and the
Micro-AIS describes “how” the intended goal is achieved. A full
description of both the Macro is provided along with a set of
guiding principals of how the AIS is derived and added to the
framework.
I. INTRODUCTION
A necessary component to next generation cyber attack
detection or prediction algorithms is understanding the tactics
and the techniques that adversaries use to learn about the
network, compromise assets, and eventually achieve their
end-objective (stealing information, disrupting services, etc.).
Behaviors of cyber attackers are extremely diverse due to
differences in skill level and/or situational behaviors given the
target’s network configuration. It is unlikely that two attackers
will share the exact same attack processes. Efficient extraction
and comprehension of attack actions and the corresponding
behaviors can enable rapid response or even application to
similar network assets for proactive cyber defense. A common
framework that describes a process of attacker actions is the
Cyber Attack Kill Chain which describes the attack process
as a chain of action types. Cyber defense may detect intrusion
in the earlier stage of the kill chain and ‘cut the chain’ to
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stop the attacker from performing the later, more critical kill
chain stages. Since the introduction of the Cyber Attack Kill
Chain by Lockheed Martin in 2011 [1], organizations have
adapted the concept of a Kill Chain for specific attack types
such as Advanced Persistent Threats (APT), insider threats, etc
[2]. Typical kill chains summarize the entire attack sequence
typically in less than 10 stages creating a concise and easy to
understand attacker description for both security professionals
and the average person. However, when it comes to generally
classifying attack actions, most kill chain descriptions are not
well suited to differentiate the different tactics and techniques
that an adversary may use as they are intended to represent
milestones in the attack sequence but not the individual
actions. Moskal [3] gave a comparative study of the different
kill chains and summarized the various attack stages into
reconnaissance, exploitation, and exfiltration categories. Table
I shows the number of classes for some of the most popular
kill chains.
TABLE I
ATTACK STAGE CLASSIFICATIONS BY VARIOUS ORGANIZATIONS.
Year Type # of Classes
MTIRE CAPEC [4] 2007 Attack Patterns 517
Lockheed Martin [1] 2011 Kill Chain 7
STIX [5] 2012 Attack Descriptor 9
MITRE Kill Chain 2013 Kill Chain 7
MTIRE Att&ck [6] 2013 Attack Techniques 295
Varonis [7] 2018 Kill Chain 8
MITRE Unified Kill Chain [8] 2018 Kill Chain 20
MITRE ATT&CK [8] uses 12 tactics to classify 295 attack
technique classes and is an industry-leading and comprehen-
sive attack-type description. However, it only considers the
‘right’ side of the kill chain: exploitation and exfiltration
and the 295 techniques can be too detailed to explicitly
map to intrusion observables (e.g., IDS alerts, access logs,
attack traces, etc.). This limitation inhibits the modeling and
discovery of adversary behaviors and processes. Some attack
techniques in ATT&CK are specific to the target network,
where the adversary chose the technique because it was easily
accessible in that network. In a different network, the same
attacker may exercise the same thought process, come to a
similar attack action with the same intended outcome, yet it
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leads to a different ATT&CK technique.
Observing the attacker’s actions is extremely challenging
as it is unlikely that the attacker will cooperate to resolve
their intentions and thought processes. Instead, we turn to
the most common and abundant sources of attacker’s actions,
Intrusion Detection System (IDS) logs, where network traffic
passing though a sensor is analyzed against known signatures
of specific behaviors raising alerts to the administrators when
suspicious actions are performed on the network. IDS’s are
not yet able to resolve the observed actions to the ATT&CK
techniques due to the complexity of IDS rules. Instead, we
propose the Action-Intent Framework (AIF) containing a set
of Action-Intent States (AIS) that is designed to resolve the
essence of ‘what’ the attacker was trying to achieve and
‘how’ they achieved it in reference to open-source IDS (e.g.,
Suricata and Snort) signatures. To capture ‘what’ the attacker
has achieved, we define the concept of Macro-AIS as a high
level description of the outcome of the action such as privilege
escalation or data destruction. The Macro-AIS’s are similar
to the higher-level tactics described in ATT&CK but also
includes reconnaissance stages and zero-day attack stages.
For each Macro-AIS, we define a set of Micro-AIS’s that
describe ‘how’ the adversary achieves the Macro-AIS. The
Micro-AIS’s are similar to the techniques defined by ATT&CK
but with a focus on action-types that are observable by an IDS
and not specific to any service, operating system, or network
configuration.
II. ACTION-INTENT STATE SELECTION METHODOLOGY
Kill Chains as a part of their description imply an order of
the stages to progress towards a goal and typically are specific
to a type of attack/attacker. Figure 1 shows the relevant stages
for an attacker depends on the type of attacker or skill level
and the cyclical visualization implies that the adversary needs
to go through multiple iterations to achieve their end goal. Our
end objective is to use our defined attack stages to discover
how the attack stages are used and relate to previous attack
stages and upcoming attack stages and because of this we do
not define a specific order of stages. It is this order is what we
want to discover and analyze the reasoning the attacker chose
these stages and why the particular order is chosen.
Taking inspiration from MITRE Att&ck where the “tech-
niques” are classified under a high-level description called a
“tactic”, we employ a similar two-tier structure with a more
restrictive and specialized criteria to better capture the intent
of the action performed. Our Macro AIS definitions contains
commonalities to the Att&ck Tactics but the Macro AIS
focuses on resolving action-intents from the defense’s perspec-
tive where tactics such as “persistence” or “defense evasion”
describes intentions that may not be possible to definitively
determine with just IDS logs. The Micro AIS definition also
has similarities to the Att&ck Techniques however a key
difference is that the Micro AIS does not include techniques
that are specific to any one system such as Kerberoasting or
very specialized techniques such as exfiltration though “Audio
Capture”. With these restrictions, we propose a framework to
Fig. 1. Dell Secureworks Advanced Persistent Threat kill chain stage
description
define a set of AIS so that a sequence of AIS derived from
IDS observables describes the type of actions specific attacker
takes that is general to a network configuration.
To develop the AIF we define a set of guiding principals that
dictate when an action or action type is added to the AIF with
a corresponding macro or micro AIS. We intend that the AIF
will evolve over time (as with MITRE Att&ck) and changes
to the criteria or additional states may be defined in the future.
A. Macro Action-Intent States
Table II contains the currently defined Macro AIS and their
descriptions. Each of these Macro AIS describes a high level
description of “what” the attacker has performed but does not
describe a specific method of to achieve the state. Our guiding
principals for defining an Macro AIS is as follows:
1) The stage describes the impact or end goal of the action,
2) the stage does not describe a specific means of achieving
a goal, and
• For example, there are multiple methods to achieve
“privilege escalation” which has a specific impact.
3) if an action type has technical or behavioral properties
in-which other macro stages do not accurately describe
the action’s outcome due to different means of observ-
ability
• “Active reconnaissance” actions (e.g. network scan-
ning) typically can be observed using an IDS where
“passive reconnaissance” like social engineering
cannot be observed by traditional technical methods
and are used in different situations.
States such as passive and active reconnaissance describe
actions where the primary goal is to gather information about
the target whether its through publically accessible means
(passive) or technical approaches using scanning tools for ex-
ample (active). Privilege Escalation, Targeted Exploits, Ensure
Access, and Zero-Day describe some sort of exploitation of the
target to allow the attacker to gain access or ensure access to
the target. Although Zero-days are by nature difficult to detect,
these types of actions are included as the usage of zero days is
a critical differentiator of attacker behaviors and certain types
of sensors like anomaly detectors do have the capability to
observe zero-days. States such as Disrupt, Distort, Destroy,
Disclosure, and Delivery describes a specific end impact that
an attacker may perform as either a sub-goal or end-goal of
the overall attack. For example attackers may choose to disrupt
specific machines as they are traversing the network to draw
attention away from the action where crucial information such
as customer data is disclosed to the attacker. Under each Macro
AIS will be a set of Micro AIS which will describe “how” the
attacker chose to achieve the behavior described in as Micro
AIS in the following section.
B. Micro Action-Intent States
The Micro AIS is similar to the MITRE Att&ck techniques
but with the key difference is that we do not include techniques
that are specific to any one service, operating system, or
network. In the case of privilege escalation, MITRE Att&ck
defines techniques like “Sudo” and “Bypass User Account
Control” which are legitimate techniques to gain root access to
Linux and Windows machines respectively however the choice
of choosing these one of these techniques is situational de-
pending on the network. The true intention of these techniques
was to gain administrative access to the machine regardless of
the network, thus our methodology is to combine these two
techniques based on the intent creating the Micro Action-Intent
state of “Root Privilege Escalation” and also “User Privilege
Escalation”. These are two states with specific impacts to the
target, used in different situations, and describes the intentions
of the adversary without requiring information about the target
network. Our currently defined Micro AIS is defined in Table
III and our guiding principals for selecting new states for the
Micro AIS is defined below:
1) The state describes a specific and unique means of
achieving an macro attack stage type,
• Network sniffing credential access and brute force
credential access can achieve privilege escalation
however are used in different situations and are
observed differently
2) the state is service and platform agnostic,
3) the state has a well defined impact on a type of target
or yields different response from the target, and
• For example, “End-point DoS” is used to target
services where “Network DoS” targets a whole
network which has significantly different impact
• Attackers may use different types of reconnaissance
actions to reveal different characteristics of the
network, services, or vulnerabilities of a network
4) if the state has observable characteristics that differen-
tiates itself from other stages within the same macro
attack stage.
• The micro states for “End-Point DoS” and “Service
Stop” both are disrupting the function of a single
machine however end-point DoS implies disruption
by exhausting system resources for example and ser-
vice stop involves directly terminating the process.
III. USES FOR THE ACTION-INTENT FRAMEWORK
The AIF was designed with a few use cases in mind and
may be adapted to a specific use case if needed. Given its focus
on observable characteristics of an adversary, we believe the
AIF can be used for adversarial sequence extraction from IDS
alerts as shown by Moskal et al. [9]. Sequences of common
alert type where developed and compared to other attackers to
assess commonalities between attacker processes, however the
alert signature type used was not reflective of the intentions
of the adversary. We believe that this work can be used to
enhance the contextual meaning of these sequences so that
the intent of the adversarial actions are easily interpreted. This
concept requires a method to classify alert signatures to the
AIF which is not an easy task given the many different types of
observables and the vast number of alert rules and architectures
available; a future work will be presented on this topic at a
later date. Once sequences of AIS are determined, we also
believe that the extracted processes of attacker actions can be
simulated where a cyber attack simulator can use the AIS as
guidance to select an action that is both representative of the
attacker action and what is possible on the target network [10].
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TABLE II
THE MACRO ACTION-INTENT STATES CURRENTLY DEFINED IN THE FRAMEWORK.
Macro AIS Description
Passive Recon An attempt to gain information about targeted computersand networks without actively engaging with the systems
Active Recon An intruder engages with the targeted system to gather informationabout vulnerabilities
Privilege Escalation. Act of exploiting a bug, design flaw or configuration oversight in anoperating system or software application to gain elevated access
Targeted Exploits Exploits targeting a specific service, application, organizational entity,or person
Ensure Access Actions which expand preexisting access or circumvent active defensestrategies
Zero Day Actions performed employing undocumented vulnerabilities or strategieswith unknown consequences where no patch exists at the time of the attack
Disrupt Disruption in services, usually from a Denial of Service.
Destroy Destruction of information, usually when an attack has caused a deletion offiles or removal of access.
Distort Distortion in information, usually when an attack has caused a modification of a file.
Disclosure Disclosure of information, usually providing an attacker with a view of informationthey would normally not have access to
Delivery Actions where the intent is to place/install/deliver data that could be in the form ofmalware, backdoor, application, etc.
TABLE III
DESCRIPTIONS OF THE MICRO ACTION-INTENT STATES IN THE CURRENT FRAMEWORK WITH CORRESPONDING MACRO AIS.
Macro AIS Micro AIS Description
Passive Recon
Target Identification Determining the organizational/network target
Surfing Using legitimate methods (websites, public documents, etc) to obtain informationabout the target
Social Engineering Non-technical strategy cyber attackers use that relies heavily on human interactionand often involves tricking people into breaking standard security practices
Active Recon
Host Discovery Use of technical programs to uncover the location/IP of machines in the target network
Service Discovery Use of technical programs to uncover the services or applications employed on a machine
Vulnerability Discovery Techniques or programs to uncover vulnerabilities on machine with a specific application or OS
Information Discovery Actions which reveal technical information such as system configurations, file system contents,or information about the target/entity
Privledge Esc.
User Privledge Esc. Action which results in the adversary gaining user privileges
Root Privledge Esc. Action which results in the adversary gaining root/admin privileges
Network Sniffing
Credential Access
Using the network interface on a system to monitor or capture information sent over a wired
or wireless connection
Brute Force
Credential Access
Brute force techniques to attempt access to accounts when passwords are unknown or when
password hashes are obtained
Account Manipulation Modifying permissions, modifying credentials, adding or changing permission groups,modifying account settings, or modifying how authentication is performed
Targeted
Exploits
Trusted Orginization Exploitation Access through trusted third party relationship exploits an existing connection that maynot be protected or receives less scrutiny than standard mechanisms of gaining access to a network
Exploit Public Facing Application Use of software, data, or commands to take advantage of a weakness in an Internet-facing computersystem or program in order to cause unintended or unanticipated behavior
Exploit Remote Services Exploitation of remote services such as VPNs, Citrix, and other access mechanisms allow users toconnect to internal enterprise network resources from external locations
Spearphishing An email spoofing attack that targets a specific organization or individual, seeking unauthorizedaccess to sensitive information
Service-Specific Exploitation Use of a exploit/vulnerability specific to a system OS, application, and version
Arbitrary Code Execution control over an target by establishing a communication channel between adversary and target
Ensure
Access
Defense Evasion Techniques an adversary may use to evade detection or avoid other defenses
Command & Control Control over an target by establishing a communication channel between adversary and target
Lateral Movement Techniques that enable an adversary to access and control remote systems on a network and could,but does not necessarily, include execution of tools on remote systems
Zero Day
Privledge Esc. Undocumented action that raises the privilege level of the adversary
Targeted Exploit Usage of a unpatched and possibly undocumented targeted exploit
Ensure Access Unknown method to evade detection or controlling method
Disrupt
End Point DoS Exhausting the system resources those services are hosted on or exploiting the system to causea persistent crash condition
Network DoS Exhaust the network bandwidth services rely on
Service Stop Stop or disable services on a system to render those services unavailable to legitimate users
Resource Hijacking Leverage the resources of co-opted systems in order to solve resource intensive problems whichmay impact system and/or hosted service availability
Destroy Data Destruction
Destroy data and files on specific systems or in large numbers on a network to interrupt
availability to systems, services, and network resources
Content Wipe Erase the contents of storage devices on specific systems as well as large numbers of systemsin a network to interrupt availability to system and network resources
Distort
Data Encryption Encrypt data on target systems or on large numbers of systems in a network to interruptavailability to system and network resources
Defacement Modify visual content available internally or externally to an enterprise network.
Data Manipulation Insert, delete, or manipulate data at rest in order to manipulate external outcomes or hide activity.
Disclosure Data Exfiltration Techniques and attributes that result or aid in the adversary removing files and information froma target network
Delivery Data Delivery Intent to place/install/deliver data that could be in the form of malware, backdoor, application, etc.
